

POSSIBLE PARAGRAPH TO BE PREFACED TO "SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS"

From a rational, non-Chinese point of view, there seem to be good reasons why the Chinese Communists should be willing to enter into negotiations leading toward a settlement in Korea. Had they done so in the past, or even if they were to do so now, they might expect (a) an opportunity during a truce to regroup, resupply, and generally strengthen their army, thus being ready for a new offensive if negotiations were unsuccessful; (b) considering the views ^{of} ^{UN} some of the ^{UN} allies, to gain agreement to a free hand in Taiwan and eventual admission to the UN; and (c) to get agreement to a unification of Korea under a government which the Communists could eventually penetrate and control. Although there would be nothing like assurance that they could obtain all or any of these concessions, it would have seemed logical for them to make the attempt, particularly at times when the Chinese Communists had the UN at a disadvantage, or at times when an opportunity to regroup forces would have been advantageous to them. The possibilities for relative Communist success through negotiations still exist. If the Communists are convinced or become convinced that they cannot obtain their full objectives by military action, they may well agree to a cease-fire and negotiations for a Korean settlement or might acquiesce in a settlement negotiated by the USSR. The fact remains, however, that they have not done so, have never given any intimation that they would do so, and at the present time continue to say publicly and privately that they are satisfied with the progress of the war which they ^{MAINTAIN} ~~continue~~ they can prosecute to a successful termination.

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